

“I was found as a half-naked body:” resistance, embodiment and identity in Chanel Miller’s testimonial project

*Fui encontrada como un cuerpo semidesnudo”: resistencia,
corporalidad e identidad en el proyecto testimonial de Chanel*

Miller

Isabel Marqués-López

Recibido: 25/02/2026

Aceptado: 07/07/2026

RESUMEN

Considerado un antecedente del movimiento #MeToo, el caso de la violación de Chanel Miller por Brock Turner en 2016 – conocido popularmente como el caso de la violación de Stanford – incitó la conciencia pública acerca de la violencia sexual como un fenómeno cultural e institucionalmente legitimado, y fomentó la empatía hacia el testimonio de las supervivientes. Este ensayo examina el proyecto testimonial de Miller, constituido por su declaración judicial, difundida poco después del juicio, y sus memorias, *Know My Name*, publicadas tres años más tarde. Siguiendo la teoría de Leigh Gilmore sobre el testimonio como un vehículo de resistencia constituido a través de redes, este ensayo estudia cómo el caso de Miller ilustra las posibilidades y limitaciones del testimonio para lograr justicia en diversos espacios de poder. El ensayo continúa analizando el interés de Miller en el cuerpo como un espacio de resistencia y comunidad, en línea con

Isabel Marqués-López is an Assistant Professor of English at the Complutense University of Madrid, where she received her PhD in Literary Studies in 2025. Her doctoral dissertation examines testimonies of sexual violence in the aftermath of the #MeToo movement. Her research interests include twenty-first-century North American (non)fiction, particularly writing by women, narratives of crisis and precarity, affect theory, and life writing. ORCID: 0000-0002-7697-5459

Cómo citar este artículo: Marqués-López, Isabel (2026). “I was found as a half-naked body:” resistance, embodiment and identity in Chanel Miller’s testimonial project. *Atlánticas. Revista Internacional de Estudios Feministas*, 11 (2), 2-30. doi: <https://dx.doi.org/10.17979/arief.2026.11.2.13271>

la teoría de Judith Butler sobre el potencial político de la exposición del cuerpo en los espacios públicos. El análisis concluye con una mirada crítica a la identidad narrativa de Miller, que, según sugiere Tanya Serisier, se presenta de manera estratégica como universal y atravesada por narrativas heroicas en torno a la herencia étnica. En definitiva, el ensayo interpreta el testimonio de Miller como un caso paradigmático de las narrativas del movimiento #MeToo, proponiendo una política de resistencia testimonial y corporal, a veces en conflicto, pero siempre centrada en la víctima.

Palabras clave: Chanel Miller, movimiento #MeToo, narrativas de violación, trauma, vulnerabilidad

ABSTRACT

Considered a precedent to the #MeToo movement, the case of Chanel Miller's rape by Brock Turner in 2016—widely known as “the Stanford rape case”—contributed to a popular consciousness of sexual violence as culturally and institutionally legitimized, while encouraging public sympathy towards survivors' testimonies. This essay examines Miller's testimonial project, constituted by her court statement released shortly after the trial, and her memoir, *Know My Name*, published three years later. Following Leigh Gilmore's theory of testimony as a network-based vehicle of survivor resistance, this essay studies how Miller's case illustrates the possibilities and limits for witness testimony to achieve justice across diverse power locations. The essay continues to analyze Miller's interest in the body as a locus of resistance and community, in line with Judith Butler's theory of the political potential of the body's exposure in public spaces. The discussion concludes with a critical examination of Miller's narrative identity, which, as Tanya Serisier suggests, is strategically portrayed as both universal and informed by heroic narratives around ethnic heritage. Ultimately, the essay reads Miller's testimonial project as a paradigmatic case of #MeToo narratives, proposing a politics of testimonial and embodied resistance—sometimes compromised, but always survivor-centered.

Keywords: Chanel Miller, #MeToo movement, rape narratives, trauma, vulnerability

1. INTRODUCTION: THE STANFORD RAPE CASE AS A PRELUDE FOR THE #METOO ERA

In January 2015, Chanel Miller, a 26-year-old Asian-American woman from California, was assaulted in a frat party at Stanford University. Her assailant,

Stanford freshman Brock Turner, was stopped by two fellow students in the middle of the attack and ran away. When Miller woke up the morning after in a hospital bed, she did not remember anything from the night before. Despite the witnesses' testimonies and the extensive evidence found on Miller's body, her memory blank would be used against her by Turner's defense to rewrite the story as a consensual encounter. A year later, at the trial, Miller delivered her court speech, an eloquent response to her attacker's version and the institutional discrediting of victims, alternating a subversive message with one of solidarity and hope. Yet her words were met with reluctance in court. Even after a jury convicted Turner of three felonies, Judge Aaron Persky sentenced him to six months in county jail and three years of probation, arguing that "a prison sentence would have a severe impact on him" (Persky in Levin, 2016, parr. 30). He was eventually released after having served three months of the sentence.

Beyond the courtroom, however, Miller's testimony had a much greater impact. In the aftermath of the sentence, the case escalated into a media phenomenon after her court statement, published in Buzzfeed News under the legal pseudonym Emily Doe, went instantly viral. As a result, sympathetic responses circulated across the student community, social media, and the press, including letters from public figures such as Lena Dunham, Hilary Clinton, and then-Vice President Joe Biden (Namako, 2016). Several efforts and petitions were launched to recall Judge Persky for his role in the case, and Turner's appeal for a second trial was rejected (see Dauber in Ioffe, 2016). In 2019, Miller revealed her name with the publication of her memoir *Know My Name*, where she intended to reclaim her story outside the media discourse about the case. The book was unanimously praised in media outlets across the country (Bookmarks, n.d.), awarded the 2019 National Book Critics Circle Award for Autobiography, and listed among the books of the year by multiple publications, as well as in the 2021 Feminist Book Project List (American Library Association, 2021). In the following years, it would be translated into twenty languages, and through a year-long

cycle of public events and interviews, Miller became an influential activist worldwide.

Miller's was not the first rape case that caused nationwide outrage in the United States. Precedents can be found in the early 2010s. In 2013, two rape cases in two high school girls in Steubenville, Ohio, and Maryville, Missouri, were brutally assaulted while unconscious by classmates, and later recriminated or harassed by their community after reporting the crime (see Beusman, 2020; Sorkin, 2013). A year later, in the so-called Isla Vista Massacre, undergraduate student Elliot Rodger murdered 6 people and wounded 14 others before killing himself with his handgun, as a self-proclaimed act of revenge against women for rejecting his advances (see Srinivasan, 2021). All these reports provided an account of the intricacy of rape culture, evidencing how often legal or public scrutiny interrupts survivors' path to justice and recovery (see Solis, 2019). At the same time, it can be argued that the Stanford rape case had an unprecedented impact on the public response to survivors' testimony. As Leigh Gilmore commented soon after the statement was published, "Emily Doe's" court statement showed "how a new voice can disrupt the recycling of the same old story," that is, the cultural practice of doubting the victim while fostering sympathy towards the accused (2016, parr. 25).

Given its impact on public awareness about sexual violence, the Stanford Rape case can be considered a precursor of the #MeToo movement, which broke out as an online and media campaign in 2017, following an extensive New York Times report on the decade-long history of abuses by media mogul Harvey Weinstein (see Kantor and Twohey, 2017). The movement that started after a viral hashtag shared by actress Alyssa Milano (see CBS News, 2017) was publicly connected to an older campaign with the same name, started by African-American activist Tarana Burke in 2006, and addressed to racialized and low-income young women who were victims of abuse (see Burke, n.d.). Despite

internal debates around the prevalence of white, Western, middle-class voices in the movement (see e.g., Phipps, 2020; Berg, 2020), #MeToo has been widely acknowledged for highlighting the pervasiveness of sexual violence across public and private spheres and encouraging solidarity and reparative justice among survivors.

The #MeToo movement can be looked at alongside other popular mobilizations like #Occupy or #BlackLivesMatter, aimed at alternative, community-oriented ways of protecting the living conditions that had been rendered precarious following successive economic and political crises in the past decades. As Cristina Guirao Mirón argues, what these movements have in common, apart from their timing, is a common sense of vulnerability from which they "[articulate] political activism through the occupation of public space through alliance, hurt, violation, [and] precarious bodies" (2021, p. 87). In doing so, she continues, they "identif[y] the material conditions that have brought about their precarity" (2021, p. 87). Guirao Mirón's point is based on Judith Butler's consolidated theory of vulnerability as a political condition in a dialectic relationship with resistance. As Butler has argued, vulnerability, while inherent in the embodied status of living beings, is also unequally distributed across different bodies by virtue of political relations (2004, pp. 19-21). Under this logic, the pervasiveness of rape culture across different systems of oppression and the practices of discrediting women's testimony in legal or institutional processes reveal how the lives of many women and feminized subjects are systematically rendered precarious. In addition, Butler has pointed out that awareness of the political production of vulnerability—a condition that the philosopher calls "precarity"—can mobilize subjects to enact resistance: "vulnerability is not exactly overcome by resistance but becomes a potentially effective mobilizing force in political mobilizations" (2016, p. 14). In this sense, #MeToo can be regarded as a political movement that participates in a mobilization of vulnerability by encouraging survivors to occupy the public space of the media

and the streets as a way of exposing how sexual violence has been legitimized.

This article analyzes how Miller's two-part multi-platform narrative illustrates the narrative and embodied politics of the #MeToo movement, as well as the tensions around intersectional perspectives. In the first section, I introduce how Miller's court statement foregrounds the power of testimony to transcend the court's bias towards a much wider empathetic audience, as a precedent for #MeToo's insistence on "breaking the silence" historically legitimized by institutional discourses. Relying on Leigh Gilmore's theory of testimonial networks, I consider how Miller's eloquence and her choice to write her statement as a political manifesto enabled her to find some form of narrative justice despite the Judge's decision. In the three following sections, I look at how, just like the movement has emphasized how vulnerability to sexual violence is always embodied, Miller's testimony powerfully evokes the centrality of the body in experiences of sexual violence. As I aim to show, following Butler's notion of vulnerability and Susan Brison's ideas around trauma and embodiment, in Miller's writing, the body works as an alternative story based on evidence that contests the assailant's court narrative, and as a site of political experience and resistance to power, while constituting a new survivor identity that Miller struggles to assimilate. In the sixth section, I interrogate how, in the context of a widespread political movement, the strategic construction of a public identity can sometimes compromise an intersectional perspective. Considering Tanya Serisier's insights around survivors' narrative identity and Gayatri Spivak's contested notion of "strategic essentialism," I identify a compromise in Miller's configuration of her public identity as both universal and ethically situated—especially considering her assumption of a name and a history in her memoir. Miller's court statement and her memoir differ significantly in terms of genre, form, and momentum—in fact, the progression from one to the other speaks to how Miller acquired greater creative freedom and agency as she became a public figure and came out of anonymity. However, this article focuses

on the thematic and pragmatic cohesion between them, as part of the author's complex testimonial project, which I read as a polyphonic account that endorses the movement's narrative politics while presenting the survivor's identity as complex and expansive.

2. MOVING BEYOND THE COURTROOM

Throughout her testimony, Miller does not just aim to give an account of her assault, but also to denounce the court's alignment with the assailant and her second victimization in court. As Leigh Gilmore has extensively theorized, survivors' stories often move across what she calls "testimonial networks" throughout multiple sites, discourses, and audiences (2017b, p. 4). Accordingly, testimonial networks are constituted by a series of legal and extralegal jurisdictions that frame a certain speech within a set of rules, expectations, and discourses, including those that perpetuate stigma and prejudice upon the witness (2017b, pp. 4-6). Movement across these networks allows the survivor to resist, thereby shifting their story toward an "adequate witness" who can provide an empathic response (2017b, p. 3). Miller's testimony constitutes a testimonial network since it points to the limits of court speech and finds an alternative audience. Her story first jumped from the court to the online media that published her court statement soon after the sentence was publicly known. From there, her story met a much larger audience who became witnesses to her revictimization in court. Three years later, the network extended to a literary audience with the publication of her book, which allowed her a greater platform for her to speak out and, as Marta Fernández Morales argues, provide a counternarrative that "vindicates survivors' ways of knowing" (2025, p. 150).

Miller's resistance to the law's procedures is staged in her oft-quoted opening sentence of her court statement: "Your Honor, if it is all right, for the majority of this statement I would like to address the defendant directly" (qtd. in Baker, 2016,

parr. 5). In addressing both the Judge and Turner directly, Miller not only challenges the law's authority but also points to a connection between both addressees, thus implicating the legal institution in perpetuating rape culture by discrediting survivor speech. The eloquence of her court statement also suggests a willingness to bring popular opinion and the media to her side. Sarah Banet-Weiser and Kathryn Claire Higgins have argued that when a case of sexual violence—particularly a public one—stands trial, rarely is the survivor's believability determined simply by the court; instead, it is constructed by the media discourses concerning the latter's innocence (2023, p. 5). As the authors agree, this mediation can often contribute to the survivor's demise in court (2023, p. 5). In this respect, Miller's vindication in her court statement centers on how her believability is systematically undermined, and her account of the assault is successively co-opted in court, despite the existing evidence to condemn the assault:

I was warned, because he now knows you don't remember, he is going to get to write the script. He can say whatever he wants and no one can contest it. [...] My testimony was weak, was incomplete, and I was made to believe that perhaps, I am not enough to win this. (qtd. in Baker, 2016, parr. 25)

In this line, from its first installment, Miller's testimony aims to denounce how the law privileges certain stories over others, often appealing to the dictum "he said/she said," which disguises the stigma of doubt under standards of objectivity (Gilmore, 2017a, p. 2).

Much of the court statement's subversive power lies in its emphasis that the narrative battle for justice, both in the law and the media, is inclined toward Turner's side on account of his status as a promising student and athlete from a white middle-class background. As she recounts in her first testimony, a flattering picture of the "Stanford swimmer" was included in the first report of the rape: "[a]t the bottom of the article, after I learned about the graphic details of my own sexual assault, the article listed his swimming times. [...] I think the end is where you list your extracurriculars to cancel out all the sickening things

that've happened" (qtd. in Baker, 2016, parr. 19). The disbelief and inquiry that Miller faces throughout the trial illustrate Miranda Fricker's notion of "testimonial injustice" which designates the unequal distribution of credibility and recognition along power lines (2009, p. 4): "he's like an athlete right, they were both drunk, whatever, the hospital stuff she remembers is after the fact, why take it into account, Brock has a lot at stake so he's having a really hard time right now" (qtd. in Baker, 2016, parr. 28). Insofar as the assailant is presented as a promising man with significant value at stake, her legal persona is devoid of complexity, assigned neutral value at best throughout the court and media process. But besides signaling the constraints of court speech, Miller's networked testimony also moves in search of alternative platforms, finding new audiences and terms for truth and justice. In what follows, I explore how the author reclaims authority by constructing her story around her embodied experience, which she presents as a site of truth, political resistance, and identity.

3. THE TRUTH IN THE SURVIVOR'S BODY

In line with her denunciation of the law's alignment with the assailant, in her court statement, Miller endorses the feminist critique of the survivor's legal interrogation as a second assault by stressing a physical dimension in it: "[a]fter a physical assault, I was assaulted with questions designed to attack me [...]" (qtd. in Baker, 2016, parr. 28). In drawing a connection between both experiences, not only does she insist on the institutional dimension of rape culture, but she also points to the body as the focal point of political violence during the testimonial act. Gilmore has argued that the witness's body is at the center of a testimonial network, as the surface on which evidence is imprinted and on which judgment sticks (2017b, p. 21). As the critic suggests, the body, marked by legacies of class, gender, or sexual violence, influences the witness's trajectory within and beyond the court, the judgment that they are likely to receive, their access to certain platforms and resources throughout the process, and the effects

of moving across testimonial spaces – exhaustion, shame, exposure (2017b, p. 21). Thus, in speaking against the court, not only is Miller physically exposed to legal scrutiny but also to a larger network of power relations fixing her victim identity to a set of associations that undermine her agency.

Turner's narrative of innocence and consent not only rules out Miller's claims but also the evidence found in her body, which is deemed insufficient in court. As Sara Ahmed has observed, the systematic disregard of evidence by institutions constitutes a continuation of the violence that the latter legitimate "often by rendering those who have direct experience of [...] sexism unreliable and suspicious" (2016, parr. 1). This process renders the body itself into a testimonial agent. In this line, Gilmore describes the body as the ultimate site of evidence in court. Even when there is no place for verbal records, "a testimonial record [...] exists within the body and in the history of bodies of those excluded from the public square as full citizens" (2017b, p. 4). Accordingly, Miller's testimony stages an attempt to recover agency over her story by emphasizing her embodied experience.

As Fernández-Morales has argued in her analysis of *Know My Name*, the author explicitly subverts the assumption of memory as the baseline of autobiographical authority. As the critic argues, Miller manages to construct a narrative about the consequences of rape on the victim and her community by juxtaposing her memory blank with multiple stories about her life before and after the event, thus defining herself beyond the category of "victim" and "conceptualis[ing] rape as extended violence" (2024, p. 410). Already in the opening lines of her court statement, Miller conveys the centrality of the body in the legal process in her first address to Turner: "You don't know me, but you've been inside me, and that's why we're here today" (qtd. in Baker, 2016, parr. 6). Through this initial reference to the physical reality of the assault, Miller demands Turner's accountability in court by appealing to her bodily experience. As Stephanie

Larson has already analyzed in her study about the "visceral rhetorics" in rape narratives, Miller describes her bodily experience with exhaustive detail to counter the narrative plotted by Turner's defense and, at a larger scale, the law's conceptualization of sexual assault as an event defined in categorical and contractual terms and outside embodied experience (2021, p. 112).

Further, Miller's references to embodied experience reflects how survivors can exert political resistance by mapping their bodies onto official discourses. In her court statement, Miller recalls her emotions of confusion and shame on the morning after the assault, insisting on reading them through a political standpoint, as proof of her victimization:

A deputy explained I had been assaulted. I still remained calm, assured he was speaking to the wrong person. [...] When I was finally allowed to use the restroom, I pulled down the hospital pants they had given me, went to pull down my underwear, and felt nothing. I still remember the feeling of my hands touching my skin and grabbing nothing. [...] The thin piece of fabric, the only thing between my vagina and anything else, was missing and everything inside me was silenced. I still don't have words for that feeling. (Baker, 2016, parr. 8)

The idea of bringing the body to the testimony implies a form of resistance against the dismissal of personal experience in formal reporting sites. Linda Martín Alcoff and Laura Gray have argued that in court or media testimonies, survivors' experiences are often undermined on account of their subjectivity (1993, p. 280). In contrast, Miller's reclaims authority by evoking the sudden, visceral consciousness of her vulnerability, which overpowers her initial attempts at rationalization. Later in her memoir, Miller develops on this memory, identifying a sense of political community in this early visceral reckoning with the evidence of assault: "I always wondered why survivors understood other survivors so well. [...] Perhaps it is not the particulars of the assault itself that we have in common, but the moment after; the first time you are left alone. Something slipping out of you. Where did I go. What was taken. It is terror swallowed inside silence" (Miller, 2019, p. 6). As I continue to explore in the next

section, in pointing to the commonality of this bodily experience, she articulates a sense of collective identity and subjectivity among survivors.

4. THE SURVIVOR'S BODY AS THE SITE OF COLLECTIVE POLITICS

In addition to denouncing legal discourses around female victimhood, Miller also mobilizes the body to explore creative possibilities for collective resistance. She mostly does so in her memoir, where she has greater space to reflect on the complexity of her experience. Reflecting on the aftermath of Turner's sentence, she condemns the inefficacy of institutions to provide justice and protection for victims: "A system does not exist for you. [...] You can fight and fight and for what? When you are assaulted, run and never look back. This was not one bad sentence. This was the best we could hope for" (2019, pp. 240-41). As Butler has argued, the subject's vulnerability to political violence is not meant to be eradicated through resistance, but constantly mobilized toward a non-violent, collective demand for "a certain kind of inhabitable ground" (2016, pp. 14) that cannot be taken for granted: "[w]hen those environments start to fall apart or are emphatically unsupportive, we are left to 'fall' in some ways, and our very capacity to exercise most basic rights is imperiled" (2016, pp. 14-15). In this sense, Miller's narrative endorses Butler's meaning of vulnerability as a political space that, while recognizing systemic forms of violence, enables alternative ways for collective action.

The author embraces a sense of justice grounded in survivors' communal resistance. Towards the end of the memoir, she reflects on the outbreak of #MeToo through an approach to the body as the site of trauma and struggle, a place that ultimately refuses to forget and ultimately incites the struggle: "For so long men [...] got away but what they did never went away, even if our minds wanted to forget; it became a physical memory. [...] And while our minds attempted to abandon it entirely, late at night, lying awake alone, our bodies

protested, you can't" (2019, p. 289, italics in the original). Likewise, her concern with the body as central to the act of experience and testimony is also expressed in her memoir, through her denunciation of the killing of Philando Castile (July 6, 2016, in Minneapolis), a black man shot multiple times by a policeman who, despite the evidence, was eventually acquitted after alleging self-defense (see e.g. Shapiro et al.). Miller reflects that in Castile's case, like in her own, evidence was reshaped in court according to the narratives told by those who are acknowledged with social and institutional recognition:

My testimony was incomplete because I'd blacked out. Philando couldn't testify because he was dead, couldn't even attend his own trial. [...] I wish the prosecutor had called Philando to the stand, forced the jury to stare at the empty witness box, his name echoing into the silence, proceeded with questions. (2019, pp. 279-80)

This invocation of Castile's post-mortem body as evidence of institutional violence echoes Butler's theory of performative resistance. As the philosopher argues, the exposure of the subject's precarious body to institutional power and failing structural conditions constitutes a performative way of resistance, insofar as it shows how certain bodies are structurally constituted as vulnerable (2016, p. 16). Following Butler, Guirao Mirón further comments that performative resistance intends for precarious subjects to create "the platform for political expression itself" from which to denounce material and political conditions of dispossession (2021, p. 13). Thus, Miller's emphasis on the absence of Castile's body at his own trial and the testimony that he was not allowed to provide connects the court's erasure of his legal persona with his killing at the hands of the police institution, thus envisioning a site of vindication through his very absent, precarious body.

Miller continues to explore collective resistance in her memoir by introducing the case of Christine Ford, whose testimony against Supreme Court nominee Brett Kavanaugh in 2018 challenged institutional authority a year into the #MeToo era (see Brown, 2018). In acknowledging Ford's role, not only does Miller define her

own political identity as a survivor in relational terms, but she also points to a lineage of survivors whose political action is based on an embodied form of opposition against institutional and political power:

[Christine] Ford broke all the rules. [...] She had every reason to stay hidden, but stepped straight into the most public, volatile, combative environment imaginable, because she possessed the single thing she needed, the truth. [...] When she spoke it was sobering, the sadness filling our insides with sand until everyone had sunk in their seats. The truth holds weight. (2019, p. 327)

By attributing physical qualities to Ford's testimony, she emphasizes the importance of the body as the agent that holds, produces, and delivers the truth, thus vindicating its role in political resistance and assembly. In juxtaposing her own case with others like Castille's or Ford's, Miller endorses Butler's theory of embodied resistance, vindicating the body's capacity to produce alternative testimonial truth that exposes the power relations that intervene in institutional processes (2016, pp. 22-24). In sum, Miller narrates her body as a survivor as a site of truth and collective resistance that enables her to denounce how political violence operates on certain subjects.

5. RECKONING WITH AN EMBODIED SURVIVOR IDENTITY

Yet for all its political potential, the body also implies a traumatic and conflicted identity for Miller. This is not only due to the somatization of trauma, but also to the fact that her identity in court is constituted by frequent allusions to her body right after the assault. As she denounces already in her statement, references to her body as the signifier of her lack of agency and complexity, in contrast to Turner, constitute the epistemic dimension of the assault: "In newspapers my name was 'unconscious intoxicated woman,' ten syllables, and nothing more than that. For a while, I believed that that was all I was. I had to force myself to relearn my real name, my identity" (qtd. in Baker, 2016, parr. 55). Similarly, in *Know My Name*, Miller reflects on this identification between her body and her legal persona, especially throughout the legal process:

[I]n the story I'm about to tell, I begin with no name or identity. No character traits or behaviors assigned to me. I was found as a half-naked body, alone and unconscious. No wallet, no ID. Policemen were summoned, a Stanford dean was awakened to come see if he could recognize me, witnesses asked around; nobody knew who I belonged to, where I'd come from, who I was. (2019, p. 2)

Ultimately, Miller's vindication of embodiment also requires her to come to terms with the cultural meanings and representations of the female/victim's body.

Feminist and postcolonial critics have emphasized the political implications of writing the body as a necessary action for those authors whose sense of self has been subordinated. For instance, according to Sidonie Smith, women writers have traditionally struggled against discourses written about their bodies as marginal or abhorrent, as well as biological determinism about their sexual and reproductive functions (1993, p. xiii). In turn, the critic argues that women autobiographers have negotiated their autobiographical authority by coming to terms with these male-centered discourses, but also with their own internalized perceptions of their bodies (1993, p. 10). These dynamics inform Miller's conflicted relationship with her body throughout her two-part testimony. Already in her statement, she conveys the impact of the official discourses around her body by narrating her first encounter with the explicit media coverage of her own assault:

One day, I was at work, scrolling through the news on my phone, and came across an article. In it, I read and learned for the first time about how I was found unconscious, [...] that I was butt naked all the way down to my boots, legs spread apart, and had been penetrated by a foreign object by someone I did not recognize. [...] I learned what happened to me the same time everyone else in the world learned what happened to me. [...] He had taken off my underwear, his fingers had been inside of me. (qtd. in Baker, 2016, parr. 17)

Similarly, later in her memoir, she describes an unconscious urge for disassociation in her first encounter with the report. The contrast between Miller's reporting style, transcribed in italics, and her emphasis on visceral details evokes the disturbing experience of reading about her assault as if it had

happened to someone else:

The news linked to a police report, I clicked, scrolling, looking for victim, victim, victim. I found the *female subject, later identified as VICTIM. I found her on the ground behind the dumpster. I found her wearing a black, skin tight dress. I found her dress had been pulled up about her hips, and was gathered near her waist. Her entire buttocks were uncovered, and she was not wearing any underwear. I found her lower abdomen and pubic area was visible. I found her vagina and butt. [...]* I closed the report. I decided right then it was not true, none of it was real, because I, Chanel, was sitting at the office, and the body being publicly taken apart did not belong to me. I suppose this was when Emily Doe was born, me but not me at all, and suddenly I hated her, I did not want this, her nakedness, her pain. It was Emily, all of this was Emily. (2019, pp. 36-37; italics in the original)

As the author notes, this dissociative reaction to the report, signaled by the use of italics in the descriptions of her body, marks the “birth” of Emily Doe, her legal persona, with whom she immediately refuses to identify.

It is mostly in the memoir that Miller carefully explores her relationship with her legal persona, Emily Doe, as deeply conflicted and informed by the institutional dimension of her trauma. Having interiorized the meanings of passivity attached to victimhood, she sees in “Emily” a haunting doppelgänger figure: “Emily had followed me, reminding me I was a go-nowhere, donothing, VICTIM. This life was too sweet. This kind of pleasure, creation, reserved for people who were not me” (2019, p. 78). Widely considered one of the most common symptoms of PTSD, the dissociative response speaks to the victim’s attempt to separate from their “wounded” self by erasing their bodily experience (see e.g. Herman, 1992, p. 269). As Susan Brison observes, theorizing her personal experience as a rape victim, detaching from one’s own body after trauma often follows an instinctual rejection from a direct source of danger: “The pleasures of embodiment were suddenly replaced by the pain and terror to which being embodied makes one prey [...] My body was now perceived as an enemy [...] and as a site of increased vulnerability” (2003, p. 44). In the same way, even though Miller is aware that Emily Doe exists inside her own experience (“me but not me at all”), she also struggles to reject everything that the latter represents and move on with her

ordinary life, particularly in the months following the assault: "Emily and I lived separate lives. [...] Emily [...] appeared only occasionally to go to the courthouse, police station, or make calls in the stairwell. I did not like her fragility. [...] I knew she was hungry for nourishment [...] but I refused to recognize her needs" (2019, p. 53). Yet she soon realizes that she cannot ultimately exist outside Emily:

In the beginning I was good at keeping the selves separate. You would never be able to detect that I was suffering. But if you looked closely enough, cracks appeared. Many nights I went to sleep with my eyes leaking, arriving at work the next morning with eyelids swollen and taut. (2019, pp. 53-54)

As Brison also suggests, the survivor's attempt to dissociate is never entirely successful, since the conscious self is ultimately embodied and thus affected by the physiological alterations resulting from trauma. For the philosopher, the "remaking of the self" after trauma starts with an understanding of the self as embodied (2003, p. 45). Thus, while in the beginning, Emily Doe allows Miller some safe distance and privacy in court, she later realizes that her attempt to disassociate from the embodied reality reappears in small physical symptoms that threaten to disturb her daily life.

The author further develops on her struggle to assimilate her bodily experience under the influence of trauma, observing how her relationship with nudity and sexual intimacy changes after the assault: "I remember skinny-dipping in college. [...] We all looked funny and natural and free. [...] These were the greatest nights; [...] I remember all of it warmly, but don't know how to do it again. [...] It was just as beautiful as I'd remembered, but it wasn't mine anymore" (2019, pp. 259-60). As she notices later, it is not only the physical effect of trauma that leads her to fear nudity, but also the practice victim-blaming that threatens to fix her identity:

The vulnerability of bare skin. [...] No clothes to pull. If something had happened, no one would've ever believed me. *Well, weren't you naked to begin with? Drunk on the beach at night? What did you think would happen?* It wouldn't have been enough to say, I just wanted it to be me, some friends, and the sea.

(2019, p. 260, italics in the original)

Although Miller's memories are mediated by the cultural discourse around victimhood, she can discern a time when she felt safe in her body. In line with Brison's point on the inevitable failure of dissociation after trauma, Miller evokes a time in which she felt connected to her body while being aware of her vulnerability to others. This awareness speaks to Butler's theory of vulnerability as a condition that emerges from the body's inevitably social dimension (2004, pp. 19-21; 2016, p. 15-16). As Butler argues, having a body implies embracing the ambivalent character of vulnerability, insofar as one is simultaneously dependent on others and potentially harmed by them. On this premise, the philosopher considers vulnerability as the ground of ethical responsibility towards others: "I am wounded, and I find that the wound itself testifies to the fact that I am impressionable, given over to the Other in ways that I cannot fully predict or control. I cannot think the question of responsibility alone, in isolation from the Other" (2004, p. 46). Miller's description of the scene illustrates Butler's point on the ethical dimension of vulnerability: standing naked with other people, she is both vulnerable to them and responsible for their safety.

However, while Miller's memory emphasizes the tacit expectation of mutual care and respect among friends, after the assault, her fear responds to the dominant view of sexual violence as an inevitable consequence of exposure, something women are rendered responsible for preventing. The court's equation of vulnerability with passivity also threatens to deprive Miller of her agency through constant visual and textual references to her body. Thus, her memory of skinny dipping is followed by her narration of an episode in court when a series of photographs of her body parts are shown during the trial:

I found a list while sifting through the transcripts that I was not meant to see. Three pages, descriptions of photographs that had been submitted for evidence. [...] Photograph of close-up buttocks with multiple abrasions. [...] My body divided into squares, put up on the large projector. My butt, my chest, my vagina, were shown on a screen, a four-foot-tall labia, for the judge and Brock and his

brother and his father and every reporter and stranger in that room to see. (2019, p. 261)

Besides insisting on the idea of her body as evidence against official narratives, explained above, Miller also suggests that, in the space of the courtroom, these images and descriptions only deepened her sense of victimhood. She extends this critique to the dominant discourse of sex used in court, which she struggles to refuse during the trial:

Sex goes to court to die. [...] I just don't need it, sex, I thought, I could go my whole life without it. Sex was absent of caring. Sex meant inserting A into B, parts labeled separately, my left buttock cheek labeled exhibit 43. Sex meant digital or penile penetration, how deeply it went in or stayed out of me. [...] Sex is being punctured, your air emptied. [...] Even after the bruises healed, after the hours of couch sitting in therapy, I was still unsure how to inhabit my body. If sex was something that hurt me, how could it provide pleasure or safety? (2019, p. 261–62)

In her critique of the institutional view of sex as ultimately indistinguishable from assault, she also reflects on how this representation contributes to deepening the sense of danger and discomfort within her body.

Yet after trying to sever herself from her legal persona through a disaffected performance of victimhood, Miller eventually realizes that embracing her bodily experience allows her to actively resist legal discourse. Moved by pain and anger after her sister is interrogated, she decides to confront the court's expectations for a "good" victim: "[Pain] did not make me deficient. [Pain] did not make me inadequate. But it did make me angry. [...] Pain, when examined closely, became clarity. [...] [F]rom this day forward, I would begin to build" (2019, p. 187). As Ahmed has theorized, anger can be mobilized as a feminist response to a particular form of injustice: "Feminism [...] moves from anger into an interpretation of that which one is against, whereby associations [...] are made between the object of anger and broader patterns or structures" (2004, p. 176). Thus, in engaging with her anger, Miller discovers the political possibilities of her body and regains her bodily agency in a way that proves therapeutic.

While she is aware that she will receive further judgment if she rejects the court's rules, she realizes that it is only by exposing herself to the court that she can denounce it as a place where political violence is reproduced, and where the material and epistemic conditions necessary for speaking out are denied for certain bodies. The centrality of the body and its enhanced vulnerability during resistance is staged when Miller pronounces her statement in court, and in the audience's reaction to it:

My delivery smoothed out, my power returning. I realized how loudly I was speaking, my yelling amplified by the microphone. I did not adjust. I looked straight at the judge, meeting his eyes repeatedly, reminding him I was not done. [...] I pointed at the back of the defense attorney's cotton-haired head. He never turned to face me. I bore into the side of Brock's unmoving face, his stoic profile. [...] I wanted everyone consumed by my voice, in my control. (2019, p. 230)

Miller's account of the delivery of her statement in court illustrates Butler's dialectic relationship between vulnerability and resistance that I have introduced as a political orientation defining the #MeToo movement. Her initial discomfort and restraint eventually develop into control and defiance towards the accused, his attorney, and the judge. Involving the three of them as the targets of her protest calls for a bodily effort, an act of extreme vulnerability. In contrast, both Turner and his attorney refuse to look at her during the time in which she is reading her statement.

Towards the end of the memoir, when Miller reflects on the process and the outcome of the trial, she recounts her bodily and emotional experience as a constant act of resistance:

I began this story alone as a half-naked body. [...] I was forced to fight, in a legal system I did not understand, the bald judge in the black robe, the defense attorney with narrow glasses. [...] I remember feeling helpless, terrified, humiliated, I cried like I've never cried before. But I remember the attorney's still shoulders as guilty was read. [...] One by one, they became powerless, fell away, and when the dust settled, I looked around to see who was left. Only Emily Doe. I survived because I remained soft, because I listened, because I wrote. [...] Do not become the ones who hurt you. Stay tender with your power. Never fight to

injure, fight to uplift. (2019, pp. 327-28)

The author's reference to herself as "a half-naked body" mirrors the one at the beginning of the memoir and emphasizes the sense of detachment with her initial consciousness of herself as a victim. Yet her emphasis on the body as both resistant against institutional power and resilient through the court process relies on her vulnerable condition, conveyed through her self-description as "soft" and "tender," humble, and committed to justice. In line with Butler's view of vulnerability as a site of resistance, this final moment of Miller's literary testimony advocates this potential by recognizing her strength and dignity. Significantly, in Miller locating these attributes in "Emily Doe," not only does she align with a Butlerian nonviolent politics of resistance, but she also assimilates "Emily" as part of the more complex, active "I" that follows. In doing so, she reappropriates the meanings attached to her legal persona, thus demonstrating the testimony's potential to help the witness move far against the legal court and to destabilize power relations for political change.

6. (RE)EMBODYING ETHNIC IDENTITY

Miller's emphasis on her embodied experience illustrates Gilmore's view of the witness's body as displaying the sociopolitical signs and legacies that render certain subjects more vulnerable to violence and oppression (2017, pp. 21-22). In fact, in her analysis of the case, Gilmore notes Miller's ethnicity as a trait that affected how she was perceived in court: "Miller confronts how gender, race, and privilege combine to elevate violent white men into figures of sympathy while demonizing women of color, like Chinese American Miller, who dare to speak out" (2023, p. 36). At the same time, I suggest that, despite her emphasis on the visual politics of embodiment, Miller approaches her ethnicity as Asian American in a strategic way that does not always imply a desire to be perceived as a survivor of color.

Written under a legal pseudonym, Miller's court statement does not mention her ethnicity at any point. As Tanya Serisier suggests, this omission may imply a strategic color-blind approach to racial identity: the absence of details about Emily Doe's ethnic background renders her racially unmarked to her readers (personal communication, May 15, 2022). While Miller's choice responds to the purpose of protecting her identity during the trial, her body's racial demarcation is already operating and thus cannot be separated from her condition as a woman and, in particular, a rape victim. In her memoir, Miller addresses her decision to write under a pseudonym in her court statement as partly due to a wish not to point to her ethnic difference. Instead, she aims for a total identification with her audience beyond racial stereotypes.

The statement had created a room, a place for survivors to step into and speak aloud their heaviest truths. [...] If I had come out with my identity the room would have collapsed, its roof weighted by distractions; my history, ethnicity, family. The few that had discovered my identity had taken screenshots of my old spoken word videos, leaked with the caption, *Brock Turner has yellow fever. Wouldn't put my nuts in her chink chute. Crazy gook. Asian women can't handle their alcohol. Asian glow, red faced, lightweight, slut.* (2019, p. 252, italics in the original)

In addressing the community created around her testimony, along with the sexual stigma attached to Asian women, Miller admits to a willingness to protect herself from further stigma by establishing a generic language allowing for the formation of intimacy among fellow victims. In assuming race and ethnicity as "distractions" from her story, she adopts an approach that Gayatri C. Spivak has called "strategic essentialism," based on an intentional synthesis of the otherwise complex identity of a particular subaltern community to claim political recognition, as a pragmatic reliance on identity politics (1990, p. 45). In this respect, at the time of writing her statement, in the omission of her ethnic identity, Miller aims to claim a political space that felt urgent to her at that moment.

I became the lady with blue hair, the one with the nose ring, I was sixty-two, I was Latina, I was a man with a beard. How do you come after me, when it is all of us? One of the greatest dangers of victimhood is the singling out; all of your attributes and anecdotes assigned blame. In court they'll try to make you believe

you are unlike the others, you are different, an exception. You are dirtier, more stupid, more promiscuous. But it's a trick. The assault is never personal, the blaming is. (2019, p. 252)

Miller describes the effect of this strategic move as the capacity to transform herself into multiple other people, assuming a collective identity that protects her from being isolated and re-victimized. In her court statement, the issue of representativity is central to Miller's identity and her condition as a public survivor. It is representative identity that Joe Biden, then Vice President, emphasized in his public letter to Miller in 2016: "[she] so eloquently represent[s] 'everywoman'" (qtd. in Namako, 2016, parr. 39).

However, Miller's optimism towards her color-blind identity overlooks the complexities involved in the political constitution of victimhood, particularly when it intersects with racial violence. As Joan Scott argues, in response to Spivak's aforementioned notion, "whether it's strategic or not, essentialism appeals to the idea that there are fixed identities, visible to us as social or natural facts" (1991, p. 791-92). In this vein, Miller's envisioning of victimhood is articulated through the equation of features of racial embodiment to more superficial physical traits (e.g. "the lady with blue hair, the one with the nose ring" vs. "Latina"). This strategy subtly obscures the differences that intersect in the production of diverse experiences of sexual violence. As noted by black feminists in the last decades (see e.g. Richie in Berg, 2020, p. 267), the representative "everywoman" identity has long been identified as a white, middle-class woman with access to socioeconomic and institutional resources, rendering invisible all those women who lack the material or institutional support to speak out. Similarly, Serisier argues that this exclusionary logic may work as a jurisdiction like a legal court. In this sense, some of these generic boundaries in the most canonical rape memoirs tend to "define certain stories, by certain people, told in certain ways, as outside of that genre and can reproduce the same racial and class boundaries that restrict survivor speech in other

forums" (2018, p. 45).

Yet while Miller aspires to a representative identity in court, in her memoir, she relies on her intercultural heritage and upbringing to enlarge her identity beyond Emily Doe. Sidonie Smith and Julia Watson have observed that identity, as a defining feature of the autobiographical subject, is not monolithic but intersectional (2010, p. 41). In this line, Miller's interest in family and inheritance reflects her attempt to define herself in the intersection of multiple identities – most notably, a rape victim, but also a Palo Alto native, and a Chinese American woman. The memoir endorses the conventions of the migrant coming-of-age narrative, with an emphasis on ethnicity and family as essential to identity. Significantly, the disclosure of her ethnic identity in the book's prologue constitutes an element of identification that allows her to write herself outside the experience of rape and against any association with Turner:

My name is Chanel.

I am a victim, I have no qualms with this word, only with the idea that it is all that I am. However, I am not *Brock Turner's victim*. I am not his anything. I don't belong to him. I am also half Chinese. My Chinese name is Zhang Xiao Xia, which translates to *Little Summer*. I was named summer because: I was born in June. Xia is also China's first dynasty. I am the first child. "Xia" sounds like "sha." Chanel. (2019, p. viii; italics in the original)

This first reference to race as imbricated in her name suggests her vision of Asian identity as constitutive of her authentic self. Later in the memoir, Miller reinstates the importance of her background when she learns that, after a particularly uncomfortable conversation with Turner's probation officer before the trial, the latter fills a form presuming that Miller's ethnicity is "White":

Never in my life have I checked only *White*. You cannot note my whiteness without acknowledging I am equal parts Chinese. This single check mark was a testament to how little time she'd taken to know me, making the assumption I was white over the phone without bothering to ask. [...] *I'M CHINESE*. I screamed, slamming the table with my fists, throwing back my chair. *I'M CHINESE*. (2019, p. 220, italics in the original)

Miller's concern with being perceived as Chinese by a legal authority speaks to an anxiety to be known as more than simply a generic victim, conceived according to a cultural standard, and thus presumably white. Implied in this claim is an intersectional politics aligned with the imperative of positionality: the mistaken classification of Miller as "white" not only designs a standard position but a privileged one that she, unlike Turner, does not entirely enjoy.

However, besides alluding to the stigma that she receives from those who learnt about her racial identity before her disclosure, Miller also ties a critique of the diminishing stereotypes about Asian Americans to a story of post-racial success:

I had grown up in the margins; in the media Asian Americans were assigned side roles, submissive, soft-spoken secondary characters. I had grown used to being unseen, to never being fully known. [...] Yet people kept pulling me up and up, until I heard from the highest house in our nation [the White House]. The vice president [Biden] was not lowering down to my level, he was lifting me up to bow with gratitude. (2019, p. 250)

The sudden, widespread recognition of Miller as a public heroine defies her interiorized sense of racial inferiority, resulting in the cultural construction of Asian Americans as submissive, compliant, and always expecting white validation in the workplace.

Miller's relief in public recognition, along with her refusal to openly criticize the country's racial politics, illustrates Lauren Berlant's theory about the constitution of an intimate public sphere that replaces the concerns with political life and activism with a series of affective investments and promises of belonging rooted to the family, the nation, or the (ethnic) community (1997, p. 5). Accordingly, much of Miller's engagement with ethnic identity is based on her account of her family life, particularly concerning her intercultural upbringing and her mother's heroic migration story.

Throughout my childhood, my mom worked at the dry cleaners, as an aerobics instructor, crossing guard, [...] but every night, I saw her sitting in the dark living

room, blanket around her shoulders, in front of the glow of the computer screen, writing. [...] Once I found her crying; her Chinese website with her writing had been banned and shut down. I was unaware speech could not be free. (2019, p. 320)

This intergenerational narrative of optimism about migration and assimilation, starting with the mother's courage and hard work and reenacted by the daughter's public success, constitutes the ultimate location of Miller's ethnic identity. Arguably, this representation endorses a neoliberal narrative of the colored individual's capacity to overcome racism and adversity through hard work (Gilmore, 2017b, pp. 86-87). At the same time, it is still possible to read it as another strategic decision that allows her to expand and politicize her identity while maintaining a widespread audience in the mainstream political sphere. This compromise aligns with #MeToo's ambivalent character as a popular political movement that illustrates how testimony's widespread circulation does not easily accommodate the experiences of colored or low-income victims.

7. CONCLUSION: NARRATIVE, BODY, AND ACTION

Simultaneously a precursor and an offspring of the #MeToo movement, Chanel Miller's networked testimony has significantly contributed to an emerging consciousness of sexual violence as culturally pervasive and institutionally legitimized. While it can be argued that the outcome of the case itself foregrounded the failure of institutional justice and the insidiousness of rape culture, the survivor's eloquent voice perfectly articulates the resistance to institutional power through narrative, first, by denouncing how official and cultural discourses legitimate violence and protect perpetrators, and second, by mobilizing embodied experience to reclaim truth, authority, and political identity. Besides acting as a visible, actionable source of truth that defies the assailant's version, the survivor's body is envisioned by Miller as a political entity that connects the effects of physical and institutional violence in a gesture of

defiance and solidarity with other precarious, embodied subjects. At the same time, however, the body brings to the fore a conflicted dynamics between Miller’s agency and her legal identity as a victim, enforced throughout the trial by a series of retraumatizing discourses of female submission. In this sense, Miller’s journey towards recovery requires her to reckon with her embodied and emotional experience as a survivor and accept victimhood as part of her more complex identity. At the same time, survivor identity is revealed as a result of a series of narrative mechanisms throughout her testimony: while her strategic approach to her Asian American heritage, which moves from omission to a sentimental equation with the private sphere of the family, compromises an important intersectional perspective, it arguably allows her to expand her story to a wider empathetic audience. As part of the conflicted if expansive terrain of #MeToo culture, Miller’s narrative illuminates the paths whereby survivors’ testimonies, like their vulnerable if willful bodies, continue to speak truth to power.

Bibliography

- Ahmed, S. (2004). *The cultural politics of emotion*. Edinburgh University Press.
- Ahmed, S. (2016, July 12). *Evidence*. Feministkilljoys.
<https://feministkilljoys.com/2016/07/12/evidence/>
- Martín Alcoff, L., & Gray, L. (1993). Survivor discourse: Transgression or recuperation? *Signs*, 18(2), 260–290.
- American Library Association. (2021). *2021 Rise: A feminist book project list*.
<https://www.ala.org/rt/2021-rise-feminist-book-project-list>
- Banet-Weiser, S., & Higgins, K. C. (2023). *Believability: Sexual violence, media, and the politics of doubt*. MIT Press.
- Baker, K. J. M. (2016, June 3). Here’s the powerful letter the Stanford victim read to her attacker. *BuzzFeed News*.
<https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/katiejmbaker/heres-the-powerful-letter-the-stanford-victim-read-to-her-ra>
- Berg, H. (2020). Left of #MeToo. *Feminist Studies*, 46(2), 259–286.
- Berlant, L. (1997). *The queen of America goes to Washington City: Essays on sex and citizenship*. Duke University Press.
- Beusman, C. (2020, December 10). What Daisy Coleman changed. *The Cut*.
<https://www.thecut.com/2020/12/what-daisy-coleman-changed.html>

- Bookmarks. (n.d.) *Know My Name: A Memoir*. Bookmarks. [reviews/reviews/all/know-my-name-a-memoir](#)
- Brison, S. J. (2003). *Aftermath: Violence and the remaking of a self*. Princeton University Press.
- Brown, E. (2018, September 16). California professor, writer of confidential Brett Kavanaugh letter, speaks out about her allegation of sexual assault. *The Washington Post*. <https://sl1nk.com/8s2jyg0>
- Burke, T. (n.d.). The Inception. *Just Be Inc*. <https://justbeinc.wixsite.com/justbeinc/the-me-too-movement-cmml>
- Butler, J. (2004). *Precarious life: The powers of mourning and violence*. Routledge.
- Butler, J. (2016). Rethinking vulnerability and resistance. In J. Butler, Z. Gambetti, & L. Sabsay (Eds.), *Vulnerability in resistance* (pp. 12–27). Duke University Press.
- CBS News. (2017, October 17). More than 12M Me Too Facebook posts, comments, reactions in 24 hours. *CBS News*. <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/metoo-more-than-12-million-facebook-posts-comments-reactions-24-hours/>
- Fernández-Morales, M. (2024). Survivor memory and rape memoir: Chanel Miller's *Know My Name*. *Life Writing*, 21(2), 401–418.
- Fernández-Morales, M. (2025). *Rape narratives that paved the way for #MeToo: The crack in the wall*. Routledge.
- Fricker, M. (2009). *Epistemic injustice: Power and the ethics of knowing*. Oxford University Press.
- Gilmore, L. (2016, June 16). Stanford sexual assault: What changed with the survivor's testimony. *The Conversation*. <https://theconversation.com/stanford-sexual-assault-what-changed-with-the-survivors-testimony-60913>
- Gilmore, L. (2017a). He said/she said: Truth-telling and #MeToo. *FORUM: University of Edinburgh Postgraduate Journal of Culture & the Arts*, 25, 1–5.
- Gilmore, L. (2017b). *Tainted witness: Why we doubt what women say about their lives*. Columbia University Press.
- Gilmore, L. (2023). *The #MeToo effect: What happens when we believe women*. Columbia University Press.
- Guirao Mirón, C. (2021). El cuerpo es espacio público: Cuerpos vulnerables y acción política. *ContraNarrativas*, 2, 84–97.
- Herman, J. L. (1992). *Trauma and recovery: The aftermath of violence – From domestic abuse to political terror*. Basic Books.
- Ioffe, J. (2018, June 1). When the punishment feels like a crime. *HuffPost Highline*. <https://highline.huffingtonpost.com/articles/en/brock-turner-michele-dauber/>
- Kantor, J., & Twohey, M. (2017, October 5). Harvey Weinstein paid off sexual harassment accusers for decades. *The New York Times*. <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/05/us/harvey-weinstein-harassment-allegations.html>
- Larson, S. (2021). *What it feels like: Visceral rhetoric and the politics of rape culture*. Pennsylvania State University Press.

- Levin, S. (2016, June 27). Stanford trial judge overseeing much harsher sentence for similar assault case. *The Guardian*. <https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/jun/27/stanford-sexual-assault-trial-judge-persky>
- Miller, C. (2019). *Know my name*. Penguin.
- Namako, T. (2016, June 9). Joe Biden writes an open letter to Stanford survivor. *BuzzFeed News*. <https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/tomnamako/joe-biden-writes-an-open-letter-to-stanford-survivor>
- Phipps, A. (2020). *Me not you: The trouble with mainstream feminism*. Manchester University Press.
- Scott, J. W. (1991). The evidence of experience. *Critical Inquiry*, 17(4), 773–797.
- Serisier, T. (2018). *Speaking out: Feminism, rape and narrative politics*. Palgrave Macmillan.
- Shapiro, T. R., Bever, L., Lowery W., & Miller, M. E. (2016, July 9). Police group: Minn. governor "exploited what was already a horrible and tragic situation." *The Washington Post*. <https://11nq.com/1om6hj3>
- Smith, S. (1993). *Subjectivity, identity, and the body: Women's autobiographical practices in the twentieth century*. Indiana University Press.
- Smith, S., & Watson, J. (2010). *Reading autobiography: A guide for interpreting life narratives*. University of Minnesota Press.
- Solis, M. (2019, November 25). The 2010s made sex political again. *Vice*. <https://www.vice.com/en/article/the-2010s-made-sex-political-again/>
- Sorkin, A. D. (2013, March 18). Life after Steubenville. *The New Yorker*. <https://www.newyorker.com/news/amy-davidson/life-after-steubenville>
- Spivak, G. C. (1990). *The post-colonial critic: Interviews, strategies, dialogues* (S. Harasym, Ed.). Routledge.
- Srinivasan, A. (2021). The right to sex. In *The right to sex* (Chap. 3). Bloomsbury.